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ABUSE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE UNWARRANTED
DEMISE OF THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
STATUTE BY YOUNG V. WESTON
Nathaniel L. Taylor
Abstract: In Young v. Weston, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington struck down Washington's Sexually Violent Predators statute which allows
involuntary commitment of persons classified as sexual predators. This Note analyzes the
arguments that the court put forth when it determined that the statute was unconstitutional.
This Note argues that the case was wrongly decided because the statute is a constitutionally
sound exercise of the State's police power.

In 1990, after the widely publicized attack and sexual mutilation of a
seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington, the Legislature enacted the
Sexually Violent Predators statute ("the Statute"), which empowered the
State to commit' those determined to be sexual predators. 2 In 1991,
Andre Brigham Young, who had been convicted of six felony rapes, was
committed under the Statute. He appealed directly to the Washington
Supreme Court, which sustained the Statute's constitutionality.4 On
August 25, 1995, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Washington granted Young's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ruling
that the Statute was unconstitutional because it violated substantive due
process, the prohibition on ex post facto laws, and double jeopardy.5
The court has unnecessarily terminated a legitimate exercise of the
State's police power. A close analysis reveals that the Statute is
constitutionally sound. If this decision is upheld,6 the public will again be
exposed to a group of sexually violent persons who are unable to control
their actions.
This Note argues that the court improperly applied the constitutional
doctrines upon which it relied and that the Statute is constitutional. Part I
1. "To send a person to... a mental health facility... by authority of a court or magistrate."
Black's Law Dictionary273 (6th ed. 1990).
2. 1990 Wash. Laws, ch. 3 § X. The Statute was amended in 1992 and 1995. 1992 Wash. Laws,
ch. 45; 1995 Wash. Laws, ch. 216. It is now codified at Wash. Rev. Code ch. 71.09 (1994 & Supp.

1995).
3. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 16, 857 P.2d 989, 995 (1993).
4. Id. at 59, 857 P.2d at 1018.
5. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
6. The State appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard oral argument on March
6, 1996.
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details the Statute and its history. Part II provides background on the
relevant constitutional doctrines. Part III reviews the facts and procedural
history of Young's case. Finally, part IV criticizes the court's decision
and argues that the Statute meets constitutional requirements.
I.

THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS STATUTE

A.

History

On May 20, 1989, Earl Kenneth Shriner raped and sexurally mutilated
a seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington.7 While riding his bicycle
to a friend's house, the boy was abducted by Shriner. Shriner forced the
boy to perform fellatio, sodomized him, stabbed him in the back, choked
him with a cord, and severed the boy's penis. Nonetheless, the boy
survived the attack.8
Public outcry was tremendous, over both the viciousness of the attack
and the fact that Shriner, a man with a lengthy history of murder, assault,
and sexual crimes against children, somehow had been free to re-offend.9
By May 26, the Governor Booth Gardner's office had received 1000
letters and phone calls about the case---the most ever received by the
Governor in such a short time.'0 On June 15, 1989, less than one month
after the attack, Gardner created the Governor's Task Force on
Community Protection."
The Task Force had the following responsibilities:
1. Review the current criminal justice system and the mental health
civil involuntary commitment process to measure their
effectiveness in confining persons who are not safe to be at large in
the community.
2. Assess the relationship between these criminal and mental health
systems to identify the shortcomings.

7. David Boemer, Confronting Violence: In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. Puget Sound L. Rev.
525 (1992). Boerner, a former prosecutor and current Professor of Law at Seatth; University, was a
member of the Governor's task force on community protection, and was the prircipal author of the
Sexually Violent Predators statute. Id. at 566-75.

8. Id. at 525.
9. Id. at 526-27.
10. Id. at 534.
11. Id. at 538 (citing Exec. Order No. 89-04, Wash. St. Reg. 89-13-055 (1989))
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3. Research the feasibility of creating a specialized, secure facility
for certain categories of people who represent the most risk to
society.
4. Consider research and approaches to enhancing our ability to
accurately predict future behavior of persons who have committed
or who have threatened to commit violent criminal acts and
establish legal criteria for confining them.' 2
The Task Force, chaired by Norm Maleng, King County Prosecuting
Attorney, delivered its final report to the Governor on November 28,
1989.'1
The Task Force first looked at the existing criminal justice system. It
determined that changing the criminal justice system would promote
unjust punishment rather than incapacitation, and that any change in
criminal laws could not have the necessary retroactive effect to protect
the community. 4
The Task Force also noted that the Legislature had reformed the civil
commitment system in 1973 to emphasize short-term treatment and
release and only applied it to those with serious mental illness. 5 Because
the civil commitment statute requires proof of a recent act and was
clearly intended for short-term confinement, 6 the Task Force concluded
that this statute would not meet its goal.' 7 Instead, the Task Force
proposed a new civil commitment
statute for offenders defined as
"sexually violent predators. ' ' 18
The aim of the new statute was to fill the gap between the existing
civil commitment process and the criminal justice system. 9 Shriner's
case underscored this gap-his criminal sentence had expired, yet he

12. Id.
13. Task Force on Community Protection, Final Report to Booth Gardner, Governor, State of
Washington (1989) [hereinafter FinalReport].
14. Boemer, supra note 7, at 548-50 (stating that inflexible sentencing would not match
culpability and that changing the criminal code would not incapacitate prior offenders).
15. Id. at 543; see also Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010 (1994).
16. wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.010 (1994).
17. Boerner, supra note 7, at 544; see also Final Report, supra note 13, at 11-21. Furthermore,
although the statutory standard for civil commitment includes many mental disorders common to sex
predators, in practice the standard of commitment is more narrowly defined. Boemer, supra note 7,
at 543. Commonly, commitment hinges on medical rather than legal definitions of mental illness. Id.
at 543 n. 17.
18. FinalReport,supra note 13, at 11-23,111-74 to 79.
19. Boerner, supra note 7, at 566.
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continued to pose a threat to the community. Nevertheless, his mental
illness did not meet the statutory criteria, so he was not committed.2" The
new Statute was not intended to replace or supersede either of the
existing systems. 2 The Task Force did not want the Statute to be
unworkable or unconstitutionally broad22 Therefore, the Statute was
narrowly drawn to apply only to those who had committed a sexual
crime and had a mental pathology that predisposed them to commit
further acts of sexual violence.23
B.

The Statute

The Sexually Violent Predators statute was passed as part of the larger
Community Protection Act by the Washington State 'Legislature in
1990.24 The Statute was amended in 1992 and again in 199:5.21 It provides
for indefinite civil commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators. 2 6
A "sexually violent predator" is defined as a person "who has been
convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence arid who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not
confined in a secure facility. '27 "Predatory" acts are those "directed
towards strangers or persons with whom a relationship has been
established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." 28 A
"sexually violent offense" includes not only sexual crimes such as rape
and child molestation, but also murder, assault, kidnapping, burglary,
and unlawful imprisonment if it is determined beyond a reasonable doubt
that such a crime was sexually motivated.2 9 The Statute does not define
"personality disorder" and instead defers to the generally accepted

20. Id. at 542.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 567-68.
23. Id. at 568-69.
24. 1990 Wash. Laws, ch. 3.
25. 1992 Wash. Laws, ch. 45; 1995 Wash. Laws, ch. 216. Although the 199i amendments took
effect on July 23, 1995, the decision in Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995), was
based on the Statute as it was codified before the amendments. However, the Emendments do not
significantly change the analysis here. Any relevant differences will be indicated.
26. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 71.09 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
27. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1995).
28. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(4) (Supp. 1995).
29. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(6) (Supp. 1995).
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medical definition.3 ° The Statute defines "mental abnormality" as a
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to the commission of criminal
sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health
and safety of others."' 3. "Mental abnormality" is a legal term designed to
include paraphilia, the most common medical diagnosis of sexual
predators.32 This term also was chosen because it had withstood
constitutional attack in a similar context.33
Under the Statute, the State can initiate the involuntary commitment
process when a person's criminal sentence is about to expire; or, if the
person is found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by reason
of insanity, the State can initiate the process when he34 is about to be
released or after he can be released.35 If a person has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense and released, the state may initiate proceedings
if the person has committed a recent overt act.36 To initiate the process,
the prosecuting attorney or the attorney general files a petition alleging
that the person is a "sexually violent predator., 37 A judge then holds a
hearing to determine if probable cause exists to indicate that the person is
a sexually violent predator.3' The person has a right to be present at this

30. Boemer, supra note 7, at 569 (stating that the Statute "included 'personality disorder,' a term
with a generally accepted definition in the medical community") (footnote omitted); see also
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders335 (3rd
ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-111-R]. The DSM-III-R was often used by courts when determining if
a psychiatric diagnosis is acceptable. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct 2637, 2642-44 (1993); In re
Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 27-28, 857 P.2d 989, 1001 (1993). The DSM-III-R has now been replaced
by the DSM-IV (4th ed. 1994), which is substantially similar.
31. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1995).
31. Boemer, supra note 7, at 569.
32. Id.
33. Id. (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510 n.6 (1972) (sustaining unanimously
Wisconsin statute which allowed continuing commitment of persons who were dangerous "because
of a mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality")).
34. In November 1995, the first female was committed under the Statute. At that time, there were
31 males committed. Female Sex Offender Is Considered a Sexual Predator, Seattle PostIntelligencer, Nov. 24, 1995, at B6. Because the vast majority of sexually violent predators are male,
this Note will use the masculine pronoun.
35. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1995).
36. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.030. A recent overt act is "any act that has either caused harm of a
sexually violent nature or creates reasonable apprehension of such harm." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.09.020(5) (Supp. 1995).
37. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.030.
38. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.040 (Supp. 1995).
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hearing.3 9 If the judge finds probable cause, the person is taken into
custody and evaluated by a professionally qualified person.40
Within forty-five days, the court conducts a trial to determine whether
the person is a sexually violent predator.4' The person is entitled to the
assistance of counsel and to retain experts on his behalf.42 If the person is
indigent, the court must appoint counsel, and if requested, assist the
person in obtaining an expert to examine him and to participate in the
trial on his behalf.43 Either party or the judge has the right to demand a
trial before a twelve-person jury.'
At trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable* doubt that the
person is a sexually violent predator. If the person is incompetent to
stand trial, the court first holds a hearing to determine if the person
committed the act or acts charged. 46 At this hearing, the person has all the
constitutional rights available to criminal defendants except for the right
of not being tried while incompetent.47 If the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person committed the acts charged, it enters an
appeallable order to this effect and then proceeds with the commitment
trial." If the court or a unanimous jary49 finds beyond a reasonable doubt
that the person is a sexually violent predator, he is committed to the
custody of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS). He is
detained in a secure facility for control, care, and treatment until the
court determines that he is safe to either be at large or be released to a

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Wash.
Wash.
Wash.
Wash.
Wash.

Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.
Rev.

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

§ 71.09.040.
§ 71.09.040.
§ 71.09.050 (Supp. 1995).
§ 71.09.050.
§ 71.09.050.

44. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.050.
45. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1995).
46. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(2) (Supp. 1S95).
47. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(2). Becauss the scheme involves civil commitment, the State
need not afford the person all criminal procedural rights. Because the Statute is designed to commit
those with a mental pathology, the right to not be tried while incompetent would render the Statute
ineffective in many cases.
48. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(2).
49. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(l).
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less restrictive alternative,." If the person is not found to be a sexually
violent predator beyond a reasonable doubt, he is released."
The person does not give up any legal rights, except those specifically
withheld by the Statute. 2 The person must receive adequate care and
personalized treatment,53including an annual mental examination. 4 The
examination must consider whether conditional release to a less
restrictive alternative is in the best interests of the person and will
adequately protect the community." A report from this examination is
forwarded to the court which committed the person. 6 The person has a
right to retain his own expert during the examination, or have the court
appoint one if he is indigent.5
If the Secretary of DSHS finds that the person's condition has
changed such that he is not likely to engage in further predatory acts of
sexual violence if released to a less restrictive alternative or
unconditionally discharged, the Secretary must authorize the person to
file with the court and the State a petition for release to a less restrictive
alternative or unconditional discharge. 8 The court must then hold
another hearing in which the prosecuting attorney or the attorney general
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is still a sexually
violent predator. 9
Independent of the decision by the Secretary, the person also has a
right to petition for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative or
unconditional discharge. 0 The Secretary must provide the person with an
annual written notice of this right.6 If the court does not receive a written
waiver of this right from the person with the annual report, it must hold a

50. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(l). The provisions in the Statute allowing conditional release to
a less restrictive alternative were part of the 1995 amendments, and were not discussed by the district
court.
51. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(1). The person will usually have completed his criminal
sentence because the commitment trial does not occur until the end of the criminal sentence. Wash.
Rev. Code § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1995).
52. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.080(1) (Supp. 1995).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Wash. Rev.
Wash. Rev.
Wash. Rev.
Wash. Rev.
Wash. Rev.
Wash. Rev.

Code
Code
Code
Code
Code
Code

§
§
§
§
§
§

71.09.080(2) (Supp. 1995).
71.09.070 (Supp. 1995).
71.09.070.
71.09.070.
71.09.070.
71.09.090(1) (Supp. 1995).

59. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090(1).
60. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090(2) (Supp. 1995).
61. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090(2).
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show cause hearing with the person's attorney to determine if facts exist
to warrant a further hearing to determine whether the person's condition
has changed so that he is now safe to be conditionally released to a less
restrictive alternative or unconditionally discharged. 2 At this hearing, the
person is entitled to the full procedural rights of the initial commitment
proceeding, and the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person is still a sexually violent predator.63
II.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES

In Young v. Weston, the court invalidated the Statute on three
alternative constitutional grounds. It held that the Statute violated
substantive due process, double jeopardy, and the prohibition on ex post
facto laws.'
A.

Substantive Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution p:rotects persons
from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law,65 including both substantive and procedural rights.66 The substantive
component prevents arbitrary and wrongful government action that
"shocks the conscience,' 67 even if that action was implemented through a
fair procedure.68
Freedom from bodily restraint has always been a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause,69 and this interest is fundamental.70
When the government seeks to infringe on a person's fundamental liberty
interest, the scheme must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
interest. 7' In the context of bodily restraint, this means the nature of the
62. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090(2).
63. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090(2). The district court's decision was based on the Statute prior
to the 1995 amendments. See supra note 25. In the previous version, a provision required the court to
ignore all petitions that followed a frivolous petition unless the person coulc set forth facts that
would warrant a hearing due to a change in the person's condition. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.100
(1994). That subsection was repealed by the 1995 amendments. 1995 Wash. Laws, ch. 216, see. 22.
64. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
65. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
66. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
67. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
68. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
69. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,316 (1982).
70. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
71. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993).
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commitment must bear a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
person is committed.72 The U.S. Supreme Court has identified several
situations in which a compelling governmental interest allows a state to
confine a person for non-punitive reasons. These situations include
detention prior to deportation for aliens,73 pretrial detention of dangerous
criminal defendants,74 and post-arrest detention prior to a probable cause
hearing by a magistrate.75
The U.S. Supreme Court also has allowed states to commit persons
who are dangerous to themselves or to others.76 Because this
commitment must be narrowly tailored, the Court has held that state must
prove by clear and convincing evidence77 that the person is mentally ill
and dangerous before that person can be subject to civil commitment.78
The Court has not defined mental illness, nor has it stated what level of
mental pathology is constitutionally sufficient for indefinite civil
commitment. In the civil commitment context, however, the Court has
used "mental illness" and "mental disorder" synonymously.7 9 The Court
also has used "emotional disorder" in this same context,80 and it has
stated that "mental aberrations.., might also amount to mental illness."'"
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
Flores,507 U.S. at 306.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). The Court stated:

The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens
who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has
authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of
some who are mentally ill.
Id. The issue in Addington was the minimum standard of proof required by the Constitution to
commit a person. Id. at 419-20.
77. In Addington, the Court determined that mere preponderance of the evidence was not a
constitutionally sufficient standard for indefinite civil commitment. Id. at 427. The Court also
decided that beyond a reasonable doubt was too unworkable to mandate, and therefore states were
free to set any standard of proof equal to or above "clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 433.
78. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (holding that successful insanity defense to
criminal charge established necessary mental illness for commitment, and therefore due process did
not require additional hearing to establish mental illness).
79. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (holding that commitment for sexually dangerous
person who suffered from mental disorder was civil, rather than criminal in nature, and therefore
Fifth Amendment guarantee against self incrimination did not apply).
80. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
81. In Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 512 (1972), the Court noted that the Wisconsin Sex
Crimes Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 975 (1971), required a "mental aberration" for initial commitment and a
"mental abnormality" for continuing commitment. The Court stated that those who suffer from such
conditions might, by definition, suffer from a "mental illness," Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 512, which
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Although it is unclear what the necessary standard of men:al pathology is

in civil commitment cases, the Court has been explicit in its view that
courts should defer to reasonable legislative judgments in the field of
mental illness."
B.

Ex PostFacto

The U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from passing ex post facto
laws.8 3 An ex post facto law is defined as one that is retTospective and
disadvantages the offender.84 Specifically, an ex post facto law applies to
a previously charged person and "aggravates" a crime or makes it a more
serious violation, permits a different or greater punishment than could
have been imposed, or changes the legal rules to allow conviction based
on less or different testimony than at the time the crime was committed."
The Ex Post Facto Clause ensures that individuals have flair warning of
the effect of legislation and restrains the government from passing
arbitrary or vindictive legislation.86
The ex post facto prohibition applies only to criminal laws and not to
those of a civil nature. 7 Categorizing a particular statute as civil or
criminal involves a two-stage analysis.88 First, the court mast inquire into
the intent of the legislature.89 Second, even if the court finds that the
legislature intended to pass a civil statute, the court must then analyze the

allowed for civil commitment under the Mental Health Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 51 (1947). Because the
commitment procedures differed, this raised an equal protection concern. Although the Court
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the matter, Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 517, its comparison of
these terms indicated that they are quite possibly synonymous, and certainly not exclusive, in the
Court's view.
82. Jones, 463 U.S. at 365 n.13. Specifically, the Court stated:
"The only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy
regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment...... The lesson
we have drawn is not that government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that
courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
Id. (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956)).
83. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
84. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).
85. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798).
86. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29.
87. Calder,3 U.S. 386; Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott Jr., Substantive CriminalLaw § 2.4
n.9 (1986).
88. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980).
89. Id.
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statute further to see if it is "so punitive either in purpose or effect as to
negate that intention,"9 thus effectively making it criminal in nature.
Determining the legislative intent involves examining the language of
the statute, and if necessary, the legislative history. In most cases, it is
clear whether the legislature intended a statute to be civil or criminal.
However, intending a statute to be civil "does not thereby immunize it
from scrutiny."'" Where the defendant has provided "the clearest proof'
that the statute is so punitive in either purpose or effect, a court must
categorize the statute as criminal.92 The U.S. Supreme Court has set forth
a non-exclusive list of factors to be considered in determining whether a
statute is civil or criminal. These factors include whether: (1) the statute
involves affirmative restraint; (2) it requires a finding of scienter; (3) it
promotes retribution and deterrence; (4) the behavior is already criminal;
and (5) the sanction appears excessive.93 A criminal statute found to be
retroactive and disadvantageous to the defendant violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause and will be held unconstitutional. If the statute can be
legitimately classified as civil, the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply.
C.

Double Jeopardy

The Double Jeopardy Clause states "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."94 The
clause prevents three distinct abuses of governmental power: a second
prosecution for a single offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for a
single offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for a single
offense. 95
The Double Jeopardy Clause, by its nature, always applies in a
criminal context. However, unlike the effect of the Ex Post Facto Clause,
a civil law can also violate the constitutional prohibition on double
jeopardy. If the purpose served by a civil sanction is punitive rather than
remedial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated. 96 Furthermore, the
purpose need not be exclusively punitive. 97
90. Id.
91. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,46 (1990).
92. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,369 (1986).
93. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
94. U.S. Const. amend. V.
95. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,440 (1989).
96. Id. at 448-49.
97. "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment .... Id. at
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III. ANDRE BRIGHAM YOUNG
A.

Facts

Young was convicted in October 1963 on four counts of first-degree
rape, including two committed with a deadly weapon,.98 Within one year,
while temporarily free on an appeal bond, Young was charged with an
attempted rape." Because he was found incompetent to stand trial, he
was never tried for the attempted rape. t e In 1977, five years after his
0
release for the 1963 convictions, Young was convicted of rape again.'
He was released in 1980. After entering the apartment of' a woman and
raping her in front of three small children, he was convicted a sixth time
in 1985.102
Young underwent a psychiatric evaluation for his commitment trial.
He was diagnosed with paraphilia, a sexual disorder."°- Paraphilia is
characterized by intense and recurrent sexual urges olten involving
children or other nonconsenting persons.' °4 Young's paraphilia was
classified as "severe," which means that he "has repeatedly acted on the
paraphilic urge.' 0 5
B.

ProceduralHistory

The petition for commitment in Young's case was filed on October
24, 1990206 Young was scheduled to be released the following day after
448. In Halper, the Court held that a civil fine for Medicare fraud, imposed after a criminal sentence
had been served, constituted double jeopardy. Id. at 449.
98. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 857 P.2d 989, 994 (1993).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.at 29, 857 P.2d at 1002.
104. The features of paraphilic mental illness include "recurrent intense sexual urges and sexually
arousing fantasies generally involving either (1) nonhuman objects, (2) the suffcr.ing or humiliation
of oneself or one's partner (not merely simulated'), or (3) children or other non-oonsenting persons."
DSM-III-R, supra note 30, at 279; DSM-IV, supra note 30, at 522-23. "Not otherwise specified" is a
residual category of paraphilias that are less commonly encountered. DSM-111-P, supra note 30, at
280; DSM-IV, supra note 30, at 532. "Severe" means "[tihe person has repetedly acted on the
paraphilic urge." DSM-III-R, supra note 30, at 2:31. The DSM-1V, published in 1994 after Young's
commitment, no longer specifies the severity of the disorder.
105. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 29, 857 P.2d at 1002; see also DSM-III-R, supra note 30, at
281.
106. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 13, 857 P.2d at 994.
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serving his sentence for his 1985 rape conviction. 7 The petition listed
his criminal history, including the six rape convictions, and included two
psychological evaluations of Young." 8
However, Young's commitment trial did not begin until February 12,
1991." ° The delay apparently was caused by Young's failed
constitutional objections to the Statute. On March 8, 1991, after expert
testimony from both sides, the jury determined Young to be a sexually
violent predator."0 After being denied a personal restraint petition by the
trial court, Young appealed directly to the Washington Supreme Court."'
On August 9, 1993, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the
Statute in a six-three decision.' 2
Young filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington." 3 Oral argument
was heard before a federal magistrate on March 24, 1995.' ' 4 On August
25, 1995, U.S. District Judge John Coughenour, in an order on crossmotions for summary judgment, granted Young's writ of habeas
corpus.' The court subsequently ordered that Young continue to be held
pending the State's appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
C.

ContradictoryHoldings

The Washington Supreme Court's opinion is primarily dedicated to
three different constitutional challenges to the Statute. It addresses ex
post facto, double jeopardy, and substantive due process claims." 6
After examining the factors set forth by Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez,"7 the court relied primarily on Allen v. Illinois"' in

107. Id.
108. Id. at 14, 857 P.2d at 994.
109. Id. at 15, 857 P.2d at 994.
110. Id. at 16, 857 P.2d at 995.
111. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
112. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 10, 857 P.2d at 992.
113. After exhausting the relief available through state courts, persons who are incarcerated under
state law can file a petition for habeas corpus in the federal court system, alleging that they are held
in violation of the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1995).
114. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 745.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 754.
In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 10-11, 857 P.2d at 992.
372 U.S. 144 (1963). See supra note 93 and accompanying text for list of factors.
478 U.S. 364 (1986). See infra notes 204-33and accompanying text.
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determining that the Statute was civil in nature" 9 and therefore could not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. However, the court recognized that
civil proceedings may, in some circumstances, implicate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 2 After examining the holding of United States v.
Halper,"' the court determined that civil commitment under the Statute
was not punitive, and thus did not constitute double jeopa:rdy.' Finally,
the court analyzed the statutory requirements in view of Addington v.
Texas 23 and Jones v. United States'24 to determine that the Statute did
not violate substantive due process."z In this determination, the court
carefully distinguished Foucha v. Louisiana,'26 which holds that a person
acquitted by reason of insanity may not be incarcerated when that person
no longer shows symptoms of mental illness.
The district court analyzed the Statute in the context of the same three
issues considered by the Washington Supreme Court. The court27held,
however, that the Statute violates all three constitutional doctrines.
The court determined that the Statute did not require the
constitutionally necessary element of mental illness for civil commitment
under Jones and therefore was equivalent to the unconstitutional
preventive detention in Foucha 2 Based on the factors in MendozaMartinez, the court held that the Statute was criminal rather than civil
and that it therefore violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 29 The court
distinguished Washington's statute from the Illinois Sexually Dangerous
Persons Act, 30 which Allen holds to be civil in nature."' Finally, relying
on its previous finding that the Statute was criminal, the court held that
the Statute also violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by subjecting
Young to multiple punishments for the same act. 32

119. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 18, 857 P.2d at 996.
120. Id. at 24, 857 P.2d at 999.
121. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). See supranotes 95-97 and accompanying text.
122. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 25, 857 P.21I at 1000.
123. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
124. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
125. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 26, 33, 857 P.2d at 1000, 1004.
126. Id. at 35-39, 857 P.2d at 1005-08 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. i 1 (1992)).
127. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
128. Id. at 750-51 (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. 71).
129. Id. at 752-53.

130. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 725, act 205 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
131. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752-53. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986).

132. Id. at 753-54.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A.

The Statute Complies with the ConstitutionalRequirementof
Substantive Due Process

In Young v. Weston, the court improperly concluded that the Statute
violated substantive due process. The court analyzed both the statutory
language and the legislative history in determining that the Statute did
not contain the constitutional requirement of mental illness.'33 In doing
so, the court placed undue weight on related psychiatric terminology and
misconstrued the language of the Statute through an incomplete analysis
of the legislative history. Moreover, because it erroneously determined
that the Statute required little more than a showing of dangerousness, the
court improperly concluded that the Statute violated the holding in
Foucha. Furthermore, the court also erred when it conducted a facial
constitutional analysis of the Statute' 34 when the facts before it presented
a constitutionally valid application.
1.

The CourtMisconstruedthe Statutory Language That Requires a
Mental Defect

In its analysis of the statutory language, the court first concluded that
the legislative findings codified at the beginning of the Statute indicated
the lack of a mental illness requirement. 3 Because the Legislature
acknowledged that sexually violent predators do not suffer from a
disease or defect appropriate for the existing involuntary commitment
act,'36 the court quickly concluded that the Legislature meant that
sexually violent predators do not suffer from a mental disease or defect at
all.3 7 However, the reason the Governor's Task Force found the existing
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 751.
See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
Id. at 749-50.
Wash. Rev. Code ch 71.05 (1994)
137. The legislature found "that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for the
existing involuntary treatment act." Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010 (1994). Focusing on the phrase
"do not have a mental disease or defect," the court concluded that the legislature set out to confine
persons who are only dangerous and not mentally ill. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 749.
However, the legislative finding continues by explaining that the existing act "is intended to be a
short-term civil commitment system that is primarily designed to provide short-term treatment to
persons with serious mental disorders and then return them to the community." Wash. Rev. Code
§ 71.09.010. Thus it was the system of treatment, not the lack of a mental disease, that led the
legislature to conclude that the existing system was inappropriate.
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civil commitment statute inadequate for dealing with sexually violent
predators was not because sexual predators lack a mental pathology.
Rather, the civil commitment regime's weakness lay in its requirement of
a recent overt act 138 and in its very narrowly construed mental illness
requirements. 39 In fact, the Statute clearly requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt 41 of either a mental abnormality or a personality
disorder.'
After the court examined the statutory definitions, it improperly
concluded that the definitions revealed an abandonment of a mental
illness requirement." Te42 court stated that "the term 'mental
abnormality' has neither a clinically significant meaning, nor a
recognized diagnostic use among treatment professionals."' 43 This
conclusion placed undue weight on current psychiatric terminology. The
U.S. Supreme Court has frequently recognized the uncertainty in the
field of psychiatry and has clearly indicated that this doos not prevent
legislatures from defining terms necessary for legal judgments.'" The
psychiatric community also has recognized this definitional
uncertainty. 45 Accordingly, the court should have followed the lead 4of
6
the U.S. Supreme Court in deferring to the judgment of the legislature.

138. Boemer, supra note 7, at 544 n.18. The existing civil commitment statule requires a recent
overt act for continuing confinement. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.320 (1994). The Washington
Supreme Court noted that this would be impossible for those who are already incarcerated for a
criminal conviction. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1,41, 857 P.2d 989, 1010 (1993).
139. Boemer, supranote 7, at 543 n.17.
140. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060 (Supp. 1995).
141. Wash. Rev, Code § 71.09.020 (Supp. 1995).
142. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 749-50 (W.D. Wash 1995).
143. Id. at 750. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956). The Court stated:
The only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy
regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment .... Certainly,
denial of constitutional power of commitment to Congress ... ought not to rest on dogmatic
adherence to one view or another on controversial psychiatric issues.
Id.
145. Scientific categorization of a mental disorder may not be "wholly relevant to legal
judgments." DSM-III-R, supra note 30, at xxix; DSM-IV, supranote 30, at xxvii.
146. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983) (stating that in psychiatry, "courts
should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments"). The Washington Supreme
Court has noted the frequent discrepancy between psychiatric and legal judgments. In re Young, 122
Wash. 2d 1, 28 n.5, 857 P.2d 989, 1001 n.5 (1993) ("Over the years, the law hzs developed many
specialized terms to describe mental health concepts. For example, the legal definitions of 'insanity'
and 'commitment' vary substantially from their psychological and psychiatric counterparts.").
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The court believed that the statutory definitions were unacceptable.' 47
The Legislature chose to define "mental abnormality" as "a congenital or
acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a
degree constituting such a person a menace to the health and safety of
others."'4 8 The court, however, held that the statutory definition was
based on circular logic: A sexually violent predator was defined by acts
of sexual violence and vice versa.'49 Likewise, the court reached an
incorrect conclusion in its analysis the term "personality disorder."
Although the court recognized that "personality disorder" has a clinically
significant meaning, it stated that no personality disorder is peculiar to
sexual offenders, and therefore the Statute's use of the term again
invoked a circular definitional structure. 50 In construing the Statute this
way, however, the court ignored the following, more reasonable
interpretation.
The definitions in the Statute anticipate that the effect of the type of
mental condition contemplated is a predisposition to commit sex crimes.
This reading stands in contrast to the court's interpretation that the
predisposition is the condition itself. The Statute's reference to sexual
acts narrows the class of persons who can be committed under the
Statute, but it does not by itself establish the mental condition. The
existence of a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional
or volitional capacity"'' is not dependent upon a predisposition to
commit sexual acts any more than mens rea is dependent upon the actus
reus in a criminal case. Likewise, although there may be no personality
disorders unique to sexual offenders, the Statute's additional requirement
of an overt sexual act 2 prevents detention of those who suffer from a
personality disorder but who are not sexually dangerous.
When confronted with alternate interpretations of a statute, a court is
bound to construe the statute to be constitutional if doing so does not
violate the intent of the legislature.' The court emphasized that the
147. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,750 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
148. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1995).
149. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,750 (W.D. Wash. 1995).

150. Id.
151. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(2).
152. See Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1995).
153. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685 n.1 (1962) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
stated:
It has repeatedly been held in this Court ... that state statutes will always be construed, if
possible, to save their constitutionality despite the plausibility of different but unconstitutional
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Governor's Task Force on Community Protection found that some
persons were sexually violent predators, but not me:atally ill and
therefore not detainable under the existing commitment statute.'5 4
Furthermore, the court noted that testimony before the Legislature
described a person who was not mentally ill "as that term is defined" and
who did not suffer from a "classic" mental illness. 55 The court concluded
that the Legislature intended to draft a statute that did not include the
existing statute's requirement of mental illness.'56 However, as discussed
previously, the Legislature enacted the Statute because: commitment
under the existing involuntary commitment act usually requires a mental
illness as defined by the medical rather than the legal community.57 The
Legislature intended to require a mental condition,'58 and more
importantly, the Statute expressly requires such a condition.5 9
Similarly, the legislative history indicates that the Legislature did not
intend to establish the existence of a condition solely on sexual behavior,
but rather to limit the application of the statute to a very narrow range of
persons who already suffer from a mental pathology. The Legislature
used the term "mental abnormality" because it includes paraphilia, a
medically accepted term, and because it had previously withstood
constitutional challenges. 6 There is no indication of the Legislature's
intended construction of "personality disorder," other than that the term
was acknowledged to have a generally accepted definition within the
medical community. 6 ' Presented with a constitutionally permissive
interpretation of the Statute, the court had a duty to construe it this
62
way.

interpretation of the language .... Nor will we assume in advance that a State will so construe
its law as to bring it into conflict with the federal Constitution ....
Id. See also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326
U.S. 207, 213 (1945). Cf. Alabama St. Fed'n of Labor, Local 103 v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 46162 (1945).
154. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 750.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 750 n.3.
Id. at 750.
See supra note 17.
Boemer, supra note 7, at 569.
Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020 (1994).
See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.

161. Boemer, supranote 7, at 569; see DSM-IIf-R, supra note 30, at 335.
162. See e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 685 (1962) (White, J., dissenting); United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 213 (1945);
cf Alabama St. Fed'n of Labor, Local 103 v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450,461-62 (1945).

Sexually Violent Predators
2.

The Court ImproperlyAnalogized the Statute to Foucha v.
Louisiana

Having incorrectly interpreted the Statute to lack the required mental
condition, the court then compared it to Louisiana's preventive detention
scheme ruled unconstitutional in Foucha v. Louisiana 63 In Foucha,
Louisiana attempted to confine, based upon mere dangerousness, an
insanity acquittee who doctors believed had recovered from his mental
illness."M The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that this was a violation of the
narrowly tailored requirements of mental illness and dangerousness
necessary for continued civil commitment. 165 In Young v. Weston, the
court concluded that Foucha's holding applied to Washington's
statute, 66 comparing Foucha's "antisocial personality," which fell short
of mental illness, 67 to the "personality disorder" targeted by the
Washington statute.' 6
However, the court failed to follow the example of the Washington
Supreme Court in In re Young 69 by further analyzing these terms. The
supreme court, in upholding the Statute, noted that the DSM-II-R 7'
distinguished "antisocial personality" from "antisocial personality
disorder." While the former is categorized under "Conditions Not
Attributable to a Mental Disorder," the latter is a recognized mental
disorder.' Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the Illinois
sexual predator statute' 72 that uses the term "mental disorder."' 7 3 The
Washington statute more closely resembles the substance and procedure
of the Illinois statute than the Louisiana statute 74 that was struck down in
Foucha. In fact, in holding that the Statute met the constitutional
requirement of "mentally ill," the Washington Supreme Court took note
163. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
164. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 74-75 (1992). A three-member panel at the mental
hospital where Terry Foucha was detained determined that he no longer suffered from a mental
illness, but one of the doctors testified that he had an "antisocial personality." Id.
165. Id. at 86.
166. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 750-51.
167. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 74.
168. Id.
169. 122 Wash. 2d 1,38 n.12, 857 P.2d 989, 1007 n.12 (1993).
170. See supra note 30.
171. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 38 n.12, 857 P.2d at 1007 n.12 (1993) (citing DSM-III-R,
supranote 30, at 342, 359).
172. III. Ann. Stat. ch. 725, act 205 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
173. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,365 n.l (1986).
174. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 654 (West 1981).
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of this and the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has used "mental
disorder" and "mental illness" interchangeably on several occasions. 7 5
Moreover, the Statute is readily distinguishable from the Louisiana
scheme. The Court in Foucha based its holding on three factors:
(1) because there was no evidence of mental illness, the nature of the
commitment did not reasonably relate to the purpose of the commitment;
(2) the procedural safeguards were constitutionally inadequate; and
(3) confinement was not imposed under any previously recognized
authority of the State, such as criminal incarceration, pre-trial detention,
or civil commitment.76 Louisiana sought to detain Foucha in a mental
institution despite his lack of mental illness.' 77 This violated the due
process requirement that the nature of commitment bear a reasonable
relation to the purpose of the commitment.'78 In contrast, the Washington
statute commits persons with a diagnosed mental pathology to a secure
facility for control, care, and treatment,'79 thereby specifically serving the
dual purposes of incapacitation and treatment. 80
In addition, the Statute has the procedural safeguards which the
Louisiana scheme lacked. The State must meet the highest burden of
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to commit a person.'' This
exceeds the U.S. Supreme Court's minimum standard of "clear and
convincing evidence."' 82 The Louisiana statute, on the other hand, placed
the burden on the person to prove that he was no longer dangerous.'8 3
Hence, unlike Louisiana's scheme, Washington's heightened burden of
proof helps equalize the risks of an erroneous determination in a
commitment proceeding.' 84
Finally, unlike the Louisiana statute, detention under the Washington
Statute clearly requires a mental pathology, in addition to a showing of
dangerousness, 85 and therefore satisfies the requirements for a traditional
175. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 27 n.3, 857 P.2d at 1001 n.3 (citing Allen ". Illinois, 470 U.S.
364 (1986); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)). See also supra notes 79-81 and
accompanying text.
176. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78-80 (1992).
177. Id. at 78.
178. Id. at 79 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)).
179. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1995).
180. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.010 (1994).
181. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(1).
182. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
183. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 73 (1992).
184. See Hellerv. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1993).
185. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1995).
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civil commitment scheme like those in Addington v. Texas'86 and Jones v.
United States.'87 Louisiana allowed detention under a scheme that was
not consistent with any previously recognized authority of the State.
Following a not-guilty verdict on a weapons charge because of a
successful temporary-insanity defense, Foucha was detained because a
doctor refused to certify that he was no longer dangerous, although there
was "no evidence of mental illness."' 88 This detention represented a
significant loss of liberty not permitted under civil commitment or
criminal schemes.'89 Because the Washington Statute clearly requires a
mental pathology, it meets the requirements for civil commitment.
Furthermore, as the Washington Supreme Court correctly indicated, 9
Foucha was a five-four decision in which Justice O'Connor cast the
deciding fifth vote. Although concurring in the Court's opinion, Justice
O'Connor wrote separately to indicate that the Foucha holding was
limited to the broad statutory scheme at issue, and did not apply to more
narrowly drawn statutes.' 9' The Washington statute is limited to sexual
predators and clearly requires a mental pathology, two factors which
make its application far more limited than the Louisiana detention
scheme.
3.

The CourtErredin Conductinga FacialAnalysis of the Statute
When the FactsBefore It Constituteda Constitutionally Valid
Application

With respect to the substantive due process requirement, the court's
method of constitutional adjudication was erroneous. In constitutional
adjudication, a party does not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute that does not adversely impact his own
constitutional rights. 92 At the beginning of its opinion, the court
186. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
187. 470 U.S. 354 (1983).
188. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S 71, 74-75 (1992).
189. Id. at 79.
190. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 38, 857 P.2d 989, 1007 (1993).
191. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86-87. (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I write separately, however, to
emphasize that the Court's opinion addresses only the specific statutory scheme before us, which
broadly permits indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities. This case
does not require us to pass judgment on more narrowly drawn laws.
192. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 610 (1973)). The Court stated:
A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an
adverse impact on his own rights. As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the
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incorrectly held that the Sexually Violent Predatorsi statute was
unconstitutional on its face and therefore there was no need for an
evidentiary hearing to assess its application." 3
Even assuming the legitimacy of the argument that the Statute allows
commitment upon a mere demonstration of a mental pathology short of
94
the constitutional standard, Young's diagnosis met the that standard.
Neither the court nor Young put forth any evidence to suggest that he
was not mentally ill. Because the Statute is valid as applied, it cannot be
unconstitutional on its face with respect to the Due Prozess Clause.'
The court should not have conducted a facial analysis of the Statute
without first determining if the facts before it const:.tuted a valid
application of the Statute. Furthermore, even if the Statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Young, there would undoubtedly be
constitutionally valid applications of the statute; that is, cases where the
person clearly suffers from a mental illness severe enough. to exceed the
constitutional minimum. Therefore, regardless of the severity of Young's
mental pathology, the court overstepped its bounds when it conducted a
facial due process analysis.
B.

The Statute Did Not Violate the Ex PostFacto Clause

The court further erred in concluding that the Statute violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause.' 96 After correctly acknowledging that the prohibition
on ex post facto laws turns on whether a statute is classified as civil or
criminal, the court incorrectly classified the Statute as criminal.'9 7

application of the statute to the litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be
unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations.
Id.
193. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,746 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
194. Young was diagnosed with severe paraphilia. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 29, 857 P.2d
989, 1002 (1993). Severe paraphilia is a medically defined mental disorder which is characterized by
uncontrollable impulsive sexual urges that are frequently acted upon. See supranote 104.
195. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (facial challenge to statute difficult
because "challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the statute]
would be valid"); Broadrick,413 U.S. at 610-11 (statute cannot be challenged "on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others"); see also Ada v. Guam Soc'y of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1(112, denying cert. to 962 F.2d 1.366 (9th Cir. 1992).
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, dissented frcm a denied petition
for certiorari. "[A] facial challenge must be reje..ted unless there exists no set of circumstances in
which the statute can constitutionally be applied." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
196. U.S. Const. art I, § 10.
197. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 753.
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1.

The Statute and Its Legislative History Clearly Indicate a Civil
Intent

The Statute is clearly intended to be civil in nature. There is absolutely
no evidence that the Legislature intended the Statute to be anything but a
civil commitment scheme. The Washington Supreme Court so held,'9 8
and the district court failed to put forth any argument to the contrary. The
original law passed by the Legislature was entitled "Civil
Commitment."' 99 Although that term is not part of the law as it is now
codified, the Statute is codified under Title 71, Mental Illness, in the
Revised Code of Washington. 2°° The care and custody of sexually violent
predators is the duty of the Department of Social and Health Services,
not the Department of Corrections.2"' Furthermore, the task force that
proposed a sexually violent predator statute referred to it as civil
commitment, 2 and the final legislative report stated that "a new civil
commitment procedure is created for 'sexually violent predators."' 3
2.

The Washington Statute Is Sufficiently Similar to the IllinoisStatute
in Allen v. Illinois

Noting that a civil intent does not end the analysis, the court examined
the purpose and effect of the Statute. The court correctly acknowledged
that only the clearest proof is sufficient to negate the legislative intent
that a statute be classified as civil. 2" Therefore, the court's analysis must
be viewed in that context.
The court put forth three arguments to support its ruling that the
Statute was criminal in nature. It held that the Statute unconstitutionally
subjected persons to affirmative restraint, applied to behavior that was
already criminal, and promoted the traditional aims of punishmentretribution and deterrence. 20 5

198. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 19, 857 P.2d at 996 ("Both the language of the Statute and the
legislative history evidence a clear intent to create a civil scheme.")
199. 1990 Wash. Laws, ch. 3, § X.
200. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 71.09 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
201. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(1) (Supp. 1995).
202. FinalReport, supranote 13, at 11-23.
203. 1990 Final Legislative Report, 2SSB 6259, at 144.
204. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,751 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
205. Id. at 752-53.
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First, the court noted that affirmative restraint is one of many factors
that may point to the criminal nature of the statute. 0 6 The court then
207
compared the Statute to the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,
which the U.S. Supreme Court determined to be civil rather than criminal
in nature.20 8
a.

Affirmative Restraint

In attempting to distinguish the two statutes, the court noted that in
Illinois, the person detained under the statute was free to "'apply for
release at any time.' 2 2 9 The court implied that the Washington statute
did not allow this and therefore constituted an unconstitutional
application of affirmative restraint. 2'0 A close examination, however,
reveals many similarities between the two statutes. In Washington, the
case is reviewed every year and the person may petition for release at
any time. 211 In Illinois, the case is reviewed every six months, and the
person may petition for release at any time.21 2 The court noted that in
Washington, the petitioner must show probable cause that he is no longer
dangerous in order to receive a "full adversarial hearing. 2:1 3 The Illinois
statute is silent on the guarantee of an adversarial hearing, and only
allows a hearing if the application for release sets forth "'facts showing
that such . . . person has recovered."2 4 In effect, the Illinois statute
requires the same display of probable cause to warrant a release hearing.
Furthermore, the court failed to note the Washing:on's statute's
additional safeguard-without the annual written waiver for a show
cause hearing, the court is required to hold such a hearing. :
The court further noted that the Illinois statute provides for
conditional release while the Washington statute does not.216 The
Washington statute has now been amended to provide ifor conditional

206. Id. at 752 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
207. III. Ann. Stat. ch. 725, act 205 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
208. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,374 (1986).
209. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752 (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 369).
210. Id.
211. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090(2) (Supp. 1995).
212. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369 n.3.
213. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
214. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 725, 205/9 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
215. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090(2) See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
216. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
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release." 7 Nevertheless, this apparent distinction turns out to be illusory,
whether one is comparing the Statute in its prior form or current form to
the Illinois statute. The Illinois statute allows for conditional release if
the person "appears no longer to be dangerous" but it is impossible to
determine "with certainty" that the person "has fully recovered.2 1 8 In
Washington, once the person has set forth facts which establish probable
cause that he is safe to be at large, the State must prove otherwise beyond
a reasonable doubt or he is unconditionally discharged. 2 9 Because of the
heightened standard of proof in the Washington statute, when a person
"appears no longer to be dangerous," and thus would be eligible for only
conditional release under Illinois law, the person would have created a
reasonable doubt as to his dangerousness and be unconditionally
discharged. Thus, contrary to the assertion of the court, the Washington
statute is actually less restrictive in this respect, especially considering
the newer provision for conditional release.
In sum, the Washington statute gives the person greater procedural
rights to release than the Illinois statute. The only argument to the
contrary is that absent a petition for release, cases are reviewed every six
months in Illinois compared to every year in Washington. This is hardly
a distinction which provides "the clearest proof' ' 2 that Washington's
statute is criminal when the U.S. Supreme Court has already determined
that the Illinois statute is civil. The court's argument that the Washington
statute subjects persons to unconstitutional affirmative restraint is,
therefore, simply not convincing.
b.

CriminalBehavior

The court's second argument in support of its assertion that the
Washington statute is criminal in nature is that the "[s]tatute applies to
behavior that is already criminal."'" In giving credence to this argument,
however, the court completely ignored the precedent in Allen, in which
the petitioner raised this exact argument.'m The Illinois statute, like
Washington's, requires proof of a criminal act before the State can
initiate commitment proceedings.' The U.S. Supreme Court decided
217. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 71.09 (1994 & Supp. 1995) See supra note 25.
218. 111.Ann. Stat. ch. 725, 205/9 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
219. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.090 (Supp. 1995). See supra text accompanying note 63.
220. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,369 (1986).
221. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 752 (W.D. Wash. 1995).

222. Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
223. III. Ann. Stat. ch. 725, 205/1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
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that such an argument was without merit, stating "[t]hat the State has
chosen not to apply the Act to the larger class of mentally ill persons who
might be found sexually dangerous does not somehow transform a civil
proceeding into a criminal one." 4
c.

Retributionand Deterrence

The court's final argument was that the Statute promotes the
traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence.225 Because
the Illinois statute is remarkably similar to Washington's, the court relied
on one distinguishing factor: In Washington, the State does not initiate
commitment proceedings until just prior to release, whereas in Illinois,
the State may initiate proceedings at any time.226 The court noted that
Illinois must choose either punishment or treatment ai. the time the
offender is charged with a crime. 227 The court regarded this as "central"
to the Illinois scheme, while implying that Washing:on was more
concerned with punishment than treatment.228 The court quoted Allen to
support this contention: "'[T]he State serves its purpose of treating rather
than punishing sexually dangerous persons."' 9 A look at Allen reveals
that the court took this statement entirely out of context. The U.S.
Supreme Court used this language not to argue that the Illinois statute's
alternative to punishment was crucial to the Court's decision, but rather
to negate the argument that the Illinois statute was criminal because the
sexual offenders23were
detained along with other convicts in a maximum°
security facility.
Contrary to the court's beliefs, the Washington statute's purpose is
control, care, and treatment. 3 The fact that a person may have been
imprisoned in Washington does not change the nature of the subsequent
civil commitment. 2 Once a person has been committed in Washington
224.
225.
226.
227.

Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 752.
Id.
Id.

228. Id. at 753.
229. Id. at 752 (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at 373).
230. Allen, 478 U.S. at 373.
231. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.09.060(l) (1994).
232. David Boerner states:
In Baxstrom v. Herold,a unanimous Court... held that it was a denial of equal protection for a
state to provide for civil commitment at the termination of a prison sentence without a jury trial
when a jury trial was provided for all others subject to civil commitment .... The Court said not
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(or Illinois), the purpose is the same: to protect the community and to
treat the person. While the court seemed to focus exclusively on an
alleged lesser emphasis on treatment in the Washington statute when
compared to the Illinois statute, it failed to even mention the legitimate
goal of incapacitation for the safety of the community that a civil statute
may provide.233 More importantly, the court failed to provide any
evidence that the Statute promotes retribution or deterrence any more
than the Illinois statute.
Particularly when analyzed under the clearest proof standard, the
court's attempt to distinguish the Washington statute from the Illinois
statute fails to demonstrate why the Washington statute is criminal
instead of civil. The holding of Allen covers Washington's Sexually
Violent Predators statute, and the Statute, therefore, must be classified as
civil.
C.

The Court Failedto ProvideEvidence that the Statute Violated the
Double Jeopardy Clause

The court listed three distinct possible double jeopardy abuses, but it
noted that only one was at issue--multiple punishments for the same
offense. 3 4 When the purpose of a civil sanction is punitive, it may
constitute double jeopardy if enforced after a criminal proceeding.23 5 The
court relied on the fact that a person committed under the Statute already
may have been incarcerated for a crime." However, for the Statute to
constitute double jeopardy, it must serve a punitive purpose beyond its
remedial one. 37 In simply relying on its prior determination that the
statute was criminal, the court failed to provide any evidence that the
Statute had a punitive aim or purpose. The court illogically imputed the
punitive nature of criminal incarceration to the subsequent civil
commitment and then stated that Young had been punished twice for the
a word to indicate that any substantive limits existed as to the use of civil commitment at the
conclusion of a prison sentence.
Boemer, supra note 7, at 555 (citing Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966)).
233. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S 418, 426 (1979) ("Ihe state also has the authority under its
police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally
ill.").
234. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 753 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
235. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447 n.7 (1989).
236. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. at 754.
237. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (Double Jeopardy clause is violated when "the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.")
(emphasis added).
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same crime. Furthermore, civil commitment under the Statute is not
based solely on the criminal conviction and therefore cannot violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 38 Accordingly, because civil commitment
under the Statute is not punitive and is not predicated by the same
offense, the Statute does not violate the Double Jeopardy clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

Washington has enacted a civil commitment statute to address a
legitimate social need. The Task Force that drafted the Statute carefully
incorporated the constitutionally required mental pathology component
and narrowly tailored the Statute to meet a legitimate state interest
without jeopardizing the liberty of its citizens. Unfortunately, the U.S.
District Court has erred by ruling the Statute unconstitutional and
thereby preventing the state from taking legitimate steps to protect its
communities.

238. Referring to this very statute, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Yet, while the Act's application is predicated upon the existence of one or more past criminal
convictions, confinement under the Act is not simply an extension of an inmate's previous
sentence: it has additional prerequisites and involves a separate jury trial. [The person's] current
confinement ... was not imposed directly pursuant to [his prior conviction].
Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).

